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At the time of going to press a complete personnel of
the various committees of the Denver Bar Association for the
coming year has not been determined but will be published
in the August issue.
Roy 0. Samson, as Editor-in-Chief, will succeed Louis
A. Hellerstein, who very ably edited Dicta during the past
two years.
William H. Robinson, formerly with the Rocky Mountain Law Review at Boulder, has accepted the post of Associate Editor and Mr. Hellerstein has consented to stay with
the staff as an Editorial Amicus Curiae.
In connection with each month's preparation of Dicta,
it is astonishing and frequently dismaying how soon after
one issue has been made up that the necessity appears of preparing for the succeeding issue, and an apparent healthy supply of "copy" has shrunk alarmingly. So, ye editors bespeak
the cooperation and aid of the members of the bar and ask
you to submit articles for publication, and do not fear it may
be taken as an indication of decadence, according to Fred Y.
Holland's "The Lawyers' Tool Chest" (Dicta, October,
1932), that "every man wants to write a book" was included among the signs of a speedy earthly disintegration
along about 2800 B. C.
A NEW JURY EXPERIMENT
According to the May issue of the Oklahoma State Bar
Journal, Judge C. Guy Cutlip of the Superior Court of Seminole county, in trying jury cases where the jury fund has
become exhausted, has adopted a practice of using two attorneys of the Seminole County Bar as triers of the facts. The
plan is wholly dependent upon the waiving of the regulation
jury, and is not applicable in all cases. The juror-attorneys
are designated to sit with the Court as triers of the facts and
are sworn to do so, and render a written decision to the Court.
Judge Cutlip has a docket working under this procedure
and the article states that the system works entirely satisfactorily to litigants and attorneys.
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To Members of the
Denver Bar Association:
In assuming to lead the
Denver Bar Association for
the coming year, and in reviewing its activities during
the year just ended, I am inclined toward a continuance
of its past policies and practices.

The members of the
bar talk a language among
themselves that is more or
less unintelligible to other
people, but it is very interesting to the lawyers themselves,
and I think the general policy is a good one of limiting
our meetings to subjects of
practical every-day value to
Colorado lawyers, and of
leaving too general topics to
be presented at other places.
The new secretary-treasurer will be James A. Woods,
whose energy, enthusiasm and goodwill toward everyone will insure, I
think, the continuance of that efficiency in this office to which our members are accustomed.
The committees appointed and to be appointed will be active to
produce good progress in their appropriate fields. But they are merely
the agencies of our membership, and they will welcome any suggestions and help that any member may tender to them. The incoming
officers solicit such counsel and support for every committee and for
the organization as a whole.
FRAZER ARNOLD, President.
PERSONAL MENTION
Gail L. Ireland and Fred R. Wright have dissolved their law firm
and are located as follows: Gail L. Ireland has moved to 824 University Building, Denver, Keystone 5800. Fred R. Wright remains at
his old location, 717 First National Bank Building, Denver, Main 4395.
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To Members of the
Denver Bar Association:
In closing my administration, I desire to point to
the following brief resume of
the activities of the Association during the past year:
An agreement was entered into with the Legal Aid
Society whereby its activities
were restricted.
The Law Library established in 1902 and owned by
the Association was given to
the District Court of the Second Judicial District and
moved to the new City and
County Building.
The annual joint dinner
with the D e n v e r County
Medical Society was held at
the Denver Country Club in
December.
The Legislature convened in January and, at the
request of members of the
Legislature, several committees considered pending legislation and made recommendations with reference to the same. A bill to provide for less than an
unanimous jury verdict was dropped after the Legislative Committee
called attention to an earlier decision holding a similar statute unconstitutional.
The Justice Court Committee secured the passage of a bill prepared by it granting to the City and County of Denver additional jurisdiction over its Justice Courts.
The Justice Court Committee also prepared and secured the adoption of a charter amendment granting to the City Council full and complete authority to regulate the fees to be charged by the Justice Courts
and providing for consolidated clerks' and constables' offices.
The Annual Banquet was held in April, at which Dean Roscoe
Pound was the guest speaker.
Regular monthly meetings were held at which the average attendance was approximately 140.
Committees have cooperated to the fullest extent. At the beginning of the year we promised to confine the activities of the Association
to those matters relating directly to the legal profession, and we hope we
ALBERT J. GOULD, JR., President.
have fulfilled this promise.

DEPOSITIONS OF PARTIES ON ORAL INTERROGATORIES, WITHIN THE STATE OF COLORADO

T

By PHILIP S. VAN CISE of the Denver Bar.

HE right to take depositions of parties in advance of
trial has long been conferred by the Code, but in practice has been very little used. Now, however, lawyers
in numerous states are utilizing the deposition for everything
from gathering facts for use in drawing the complaint, to taking testimony for actual introduction at the trial. And so
widespread is the practice becoming that it is very properly
called "Discovery Before Trial" in a new book by George
Ragland, published under the auspices of the Legal Research
Institute of the University of Michigan.
On July 14th of this year, due to the approval by the
Governor of Senate Bills 170 and 171, Colorado will have
one of the most liberal deposition statutes in the United
States. And if the members of the Bar make proper use of
the discovery machinery now available to them, an appreciable proportion of our court trials should be done away with,
because the definite ascertainment of the truth in advance of
trial will afford a basis for settlement or require an early dismissal of the suit.
Whether or not a party could be called for cross-examination upon a deposition under Sec. 6570 of the Compiled
Laws of 1921 was one of the most disputed questions at the
Bar, until the Supreme Court, in Taylor vs. Briggs, 18 Pac.
(2d) 452, held that no such right was extended except at
the trial itself. However the legislature has now broadened
the statute to read "A party * * * may be examined upon
the trial thereof, or upon deposition, or both, as if under
cross-examination." And Sec. 376 of the Code has been enlarged to properly define what officers of a party corporation
may be so examined, viz., "a director, officer, superintendent
or managing agent of any corporation."
The right to take depositions in an action at law is
purely statutory (18 Corpus Juris 606), while in equity the
right had been exercised from an early day (18 Corpus Juris
607). Hence, it is necessary carefully to study the statutes
in order to see just what rights are conferred thereunder, bearing in mind, however, that the Code procedure is to be liberally construed.
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Colorado Code, Sec. 479.
People vs. District Court, 66 Colo. 424-426.
Ellinger vs. Equitable Life, 125 Wis. 643.

The deposition provisions of the Colorado Code are
modeled after those of California (Ragland, p. 280) and
many of the other Western States have followed their Pacific
neighbor. Hence such citations are of particular value to us.
I.
The Code confers the absolute right to take depositions
at any time after the service of the summons or the appearance of the defendant.
There are two distinct chapters of the Code which must
be examined in connection with the law of discovery before
trial. Chapter XXXIV deals with depositions, Chapter
XXXV with inspection of documents. Under the first chapter, for depositions taken in the state, no order of court is required. Under the second chapter, no inspection can be obtained without an order of court. This definite separation
into chapters is also found in the codes of many other states,
hence their decisions are vital here.
In Chapter XXXIV the Code expressly gives the right
to take the deposition of the witnesses specified therein, at any
time after the service of the summons or the appearance of
the defendant, and this privilege cannot be denied by the
Court. In fact mandamus will lie if the Court forbids the
taking of a deposition.
Kibele vs. Court, 121 Pac. 412 (Cal.).

The deposition can be taken either by following the
Code or by stipulation. If the Code procedure is invoked all
that is required is that the adverse party be served with a
notice of the time and place where the deposition will be taken
and with a copy of the affidavit of the other party, his agent
or attorney. And all that has to be stated in this affidavit is
that the party served is a party to the action, either plaintiff
or defendant.
If the other side will waive this procedure, and as a rule
counsel will do so, unless they wish delay, a stipulation has
all the force and effect of the affidavit and notice and dispenses with them.
People vs. District Court, 66 Colo. 424.
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Except where the time of notice is shortened, there is no
provision in the Code for an order of Court for the examination of a witness; there is no provision for an application for
an order for such examination; there is no provision for an
examination by the Court of the affidavit or other showing
on which such discretion is to be exercised. The only statutory duties imposed upon the judge up to the appearance of
the parties at the deposition, and a dispute thereat, are to
shorten the time of taking the deposition, if asked so to do,
or to preside at the examination, if noticed before him.
Of course, under the general powers of the court, the
judge, upon application, may change the time or place of
holding the examination, or substitute a notary for the judge,
or judge for the notary. However, subject to those limitations, counsel have full power to fix the time and place of the
hearing (within the county where the party resides) and to
designate the judge, justice or notary before whom it is to be
taken.
II.
The deposition statute supplants the former equitable
bill of discovery.
"The distinction between actions at law and suits in equity
are abolished."

* * *

Colo. Code, sec. 1.
"Statutory proceedings for the examination of a party before
trial have generally been held to operate as a substitute for the chancery
bill of discovery."

18 Corpus Juris, 1085.
"Bills of discovery are not authorized in those states in which
codes of civil procedure have been adopted, blending law and equity
into one system and providing for the discovery of evidence by interrogatories."
9 Ruling Case Law 167.
Olmsted vs. Edson (Neb. 1904), 98 N. W. 415-417.
Fox vs. Clifton Co., infra.

III.
No showing is required as to the reason or grounds for
taking a deposition.
This is excellently illustrated in a well reasoned case in
South Carolina. The action was a personal injury case, and
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after answer to the complaint the defendant obtained an order
to take the deposition of plaintiff. This the ccurt later revoked, on the ground that, before a party to an action is entitled to examine the adversaryf, he must show a good and
valid reason upon which the court can exercise its discretion,
and that as the defendant had made no other showing than
that the plaintiff was a party to the action, which in his opinion was not a sufficient showing, the revocation of the order
must follow.
The Supreme Court promptly reversed the case, holding
the showing was sufficient, and that no discretion rested in the
court. It held:
"The defendant takes the position that a party to an action is
entitled, as a matter of legal right, to examine his adversary under * * *
the Code, without assigning any other reason than the mere fact that
the person sought to be examined is a party to the action. This presents the issue of law to be determined; the defendant claims it is an
absolute right, the circuit judge holds that it was a matter for the
exercise of his discretion upon a proper showing by the defendant.
"No illumination of this question can be found in the rules which
regulate the equitable remedy of discovery, for it is held * * * that the
right to examine an adversary party, conferred by the Code, is a new
remedy and operated to destroy the pre-existing remedies in equity;
and * * * that it operated to 'take the place of the former equitable
remedy by a bill in discovery.' We are therefore effectually shut into a
construction of the provisions of the Code. Nor are we aided at all by
the cases which involve the right of a party, * * * to secure an inspection of books, papers and documents in the possession of the adversary
party * * * for the reasons that the provisions of Chapter 5, * * *
relative to inspection of books, etc., is essentially different in several particulars from Chapter 6, * * * relating to the examination of parties.
The subjects are so different as to suggest assigning them to different
chapters, chapter 5 being entitled 'Admission or inspection of writings'
and chapter 6, 'Examination of parties.' Chapter 5 authorizes an inspection of writings only upon three conditions: (1) Due notice to the
adverse party of the application for the order; (2) the issuance of the
order by a court or a judge or a justice thereof; (3) the exercise of the
judge's discretion in the matter. * * *
"Now turning to Chapter 6, relating to the examination of parties, we do not find any provisian for an order by anyone for the examination of the adverse party; consequently no provision foran application
for such order, and no provision for notice of such application, naturally
finding no provision for an order by a court or a judge or justice thereof, we find nothing indicating the exercise of a discretion by him and of
course no implied requirement of an affidavit or other showing upon
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which such discretion is to be exercised. The only duties or powers
imposed upon a judge in connection with this matter are to preside at
the examination, to change the time of notice if good cause be shown,
to compel the attendance of the witnesses, and to file the examination,
it is assumed, with the clerk of court
"It has been suggested that the expressions * * * 'may be
examined,' 'may be compelled,' denote the existence of a discretion
lodged in someone controlling the matter. There would be much force
in the suggestion if some officer had been designated to order the examination. As the provisions stand, no order is required and no officer is
designated to issue it; the examination is to be had 'at the instance
of the adverse party,' and to him is the expression 'may be' referrable."
Fox vs. Clifton Co., 114 S. E. (So. Car.) 700-701.
Ellinger vs. Equitable Life, 125 Wis. 643.
Olmsted vs. Edson, 98 N. W. 415 (Neb.).
Eaton vs. Farmer, 46 N. H. 200.
"The very object of the old bill of discovery was to procure evidence against the opposite party to be used on the trial of an action.
* * * The statute undoubtedly goes further than the bill of discovery,
and not only allows an examination of the party as to those matters
which the party seeking the examination cannot prove by other witnesses or testimony, but it allows an examination as to all the material
issues in the action."
Meier vs. Paulus, 70 Wis. 165-170; 35 N. W. 301-3.

IV.
Purposes for which depositions may be taken.
Depositions may be taken either to obtain testimony or
to frame pleadings.
(a)

To frame the complaint.
Fisher vs. Smith, 243 N. W. 4-5.
Smith vs. Wooding, 94 S. E. 404..
Lockwood vs. Merchant's Dispatch, 254 N. Y. S.573.
St. John vs. Putnam, 220 N. Y. S. 146.
in many states a skeleton complaint is filed, depositions taken, and
the complaint amended. Discovery, Ragland, p. 60.
(b) To frame the answer.
Note L. R. A. 1918 C, 598.
State vs. District Court (Mont. 1925), 236 Pac. 553-4. (And
the Montana Statute is taken from California.)
(c) After demurrer sustained to the complaint.
Kibele vs. Court, 121 Pac. 412-413 (Cal.).
Rossbach vs. Superior Court, 185 Pac. 879 (Cal.).
(Note: Colorado deposition statute comes from California.)
Ex parte Munford, 57 Mo. 603.

DICTA

261

(d)

Before answer.
State vs. District Court, 236 Pac. 553-4 (Mont. 1925).
(Note: Montana statute comes from California.)
(e) Irrespective of the state of the pleadings.
Ex parte Alexander, 163 Mo. 615; 147 S. W. 521.
Bennett vs. Strodtman, 42 S. W. (2d) 43.
(f) After judgment.
Gas Co. vs. Court, 155 Cal. 30; 17 Ann. Cases 933.

V.
Steps to be taken to secure deposition in Colorado before
filing the complaint.
The first question to be determined is: Can a deposition
be taken in this state to aid in framing the complaint? We
believe it can, as the code specifically provides (as before
stated), without qualification-that the deposition of a party
can be taken "at any time after the service of the summons or
the appearance of the defendant" (Sec. 376). The main
drawback is that of time because Section 34 of the Code requires that the complaint must be filed within ten days after
the summons is issued.
The procedure would be to file a praecipe for summons,
setting out the form of action and relief demanded, and have
the summons issued- by the clerk and served upon defendant.
Section 377 requires five days' notice of the taking of the
deposition. If this period is not deemed too long the notice,
affidavit and subpoena (issued by the clerk or notary, unless a
subpoena duces tecum is involved, when a court order should
be obtained) should be served subsequent to the summons.
But if five days is considered too long a time, and it
usually will be if the deposition is desired to obtain facts to
aid in drafting the complaint, an application must be made
to the court to shorten the time. In no event should this application be made before summons has been served and returned into court.
Then we must determine what steps to take to shorten
this five day interval.
The Code provides (sec. 377) that the five days' notice
must be given "unless for a cause shown, a judge, by order,
prescribes a shorter time. When a shorter time is prescribed,
a copy of the order shall be served with the notice."
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It would seem that the intent of the Code was an ex
parte application, otherwise there is no possible reason for
serving defendant with a copy of the order. But the Court of
Appeals has expressly held to the contrary in Troth vs. Crow,
1 A. 455, and decided that unless the order was obtained on
notice the deposition should be quashed. In that case, however, the deposition was taken after the appearance of the
defendant, and the case should not be decisive where no appearance has been entered, as Section 414 of the Code provides
"after appearance a defendant * * * shall be entitled to no-

tice of all subsequent proceedings, of which notice is required
to be given. But when a defendant has not appeared, service
of notice or papers need not be made upon him."
However, if it is imperative that no time be lost, the safer
remedy would seem to be to serve the summons, and afterwards, as above outlined, the other papers, fixing the five day
time, and accompany them with a motion to shorten the time
of taking, and with a twenty-four hour notice thereof. Then
call up the motion, get the order, and serve new notice, affidavit, subpoena and copy of the order shortening the time.
When the deposition is taken before the complaint is
served, more objections may arise as to the materiality of the
questions than would be apt to be made after the complaint
is filed. However, the rule is well illustrated in a Missouri case
where the court held:
"The taking of the depositions has no necessary reference to the
state of the pleadings at the time of the taking * * * consequently
the subjects of proper inquiry are those that pertain generally to the
subject matter of the action, and not merely those that are encompassed
within the limits of the pleading at the time."
Bennett vs. Strodtman (Mo.), 42 S. W. (2d) 43-45.

VI.
Questions which can be asked.
Before answer, any question is material under the issues
made by the complaint (or summons) and any possible defense thereto.
Kibele vs. Court, 121 Pac. 412 (Cal.).

Gas Co. vs. Court, 155 Cal. 30.
Rossbach vs. Court, 185 Pac. 879.
Ex parte Munford, 57 Mo. 603.
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Olmsted vs. Edson, 98 N. W. 415 (Neb.).
Eaton vs. Farmers, 46 N. H. 200.
Ex parte Alexander, 163 Mo. App. 615; 147 S. W. 521.
Bennett vs. Strodtman, 42 S. W. (2d) 43.
"In none of the jurisdictions in which depositios-1 procedure is
used for purposes of discovery before trial in the scope of the examination restricted to narrower limits than would obtain upon examination
at the trial. As a matter of practice the scope is even broader than
at the trial. * * * The epithet 'fishing excursion for the adverse
party's evidence' has been employed [but has not been successful]. * * *
Taft said 'There is no objection that I know why each party should
not know the other's case.'
Ragland, p. 120.

In contradistinction it may be of interest to know what
questions the witness cannot be compelled to answer.
1. Those which might tend to incriminate. This
privilege can only be claimed by the witness himself, and not
by his counsel. (Of course, counsel should very carefully consider the bad effect of any such claim in a civil case before having his client make any such excuse.)
Lothrop vs. Roberts, 16 Colo. 250.

Barr vs. People, 30 Colo. 522.
O'Chiato vs. People, 73 Colo. 192-194-195.

2. The names of witnesses, the manner in which a
party expects to establish his case, or the confidenital reports
or communications of his agent in relation to the controversy.
Armstrong vs. Portland Ry. Co., 52 Ore. 437; 97 Pac. 715.

VII.
In Tort Cases.
Apart from the question, still unsettled in this state, as
to the right of a defendant, against whom a body judgment is
sought, to refuse to answer interrogatories on the ground of
incrimination, and with the exception of the decisions in New
York, there seems to be no difference in the right to take
depositions in actions ex contractu and actions ex delicto.
The Appellate Division of the first department of the
Supreme Court of New York refuses to allow depositions to
be taken in tort cases, the other departments disagree and
allow them. And the New York Court of Appeals has re-
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fused to declaje any uniform rule of practice, holding that it
is entirely within the discretion of the lower courts.
Middleton vs. Boardman, 206 N. Y. S. 725.
Schonbaus vs. Weiner" 246 N. Y. S. 73.

VIII.
Procedure at Deposition.
If before the court, interrogatories and objections are the
same as at the trial.
If before a notary, the oath should be taken and all
proper questions answered. If improper questions are asked,
counsel should state his objection in the record, and then pursue one of two remedies, either to have the question answered,
or to refuse to allow an answer, and to require an order of
court thereon. The first procedure saves the time of court
and counsel, and to proceed otherwise may needlessly prolong
the taking of the deposition. In any event, unless the party
walks out or refuses to answer, all questions should be asked
and the deposition finished so that the objections raised will
not be presented to the court piecemeal.
No one but the Judge of the Court in which the case is
pending has any power to rule on objections. A notary in
Colorado is simply an instrumentality of the court who has
power to subpoena the witness and to administer the oath.
From then on he must sit idly by (or act as reporter) until
the deposition is completed. In some states, as Missouri and
Nebraska, he has the right to order questions answered and
to commit for contempt. But in Colorado in this respect he
is in effect a wooden Indian.
In case the witness walks out or refuses to answer questions, or to sign the deposition, the notary should certify the
proceedings to the court. Counsel should prepare a petition
for an order on the adverse party to answer the interrogatories, or to complete the deposition, and attach the notary's
report thereto. The court will then pass upon the questions
and determine whether they should be answered or not. And
not until such an order is made and disobeyed does contempt
of court arise.

DICTA

265

Ix.
Completion of Depositions.
After the deposition has been reduced to writing the
witness should read it over, sign it and then after certification,
it should be sealed and filed with the clerk of the court (sec.

378).
After the deposition is filed counsel should protect his
rights and have his objections ruled on promptly. Section
388 of the Code provides:
"All objections, exceptions and motions in respect to depositions,
shall be made and disposed of before the trial; provided, That objections
to the competency, relevancy or materiality of the testimony therein,

may be reserved and ruled on during the trial. Any party having
depositions on file, may, by order of the court or judge, require the
opposite party to file any objections, exception or motion he may have

in respect thereto within a reasonable time, or be thereafter precluded
from making the same."
And a failure to make such objection has been held to be
deemed a waiver.
Cowan vs. Cowan, 16 Colo. 335-338.
The deposition can be read by either side at any stage of
the action, at which time it "shall be deemed evidence of the
party reading it" (Code, sec. 379).
Whether or not one is bound by the testimony of his
adversary, until the cross-examination amendment goes into
effect, is almost a moot question. However, it has been held
that one is not.
Wigmore on Evidence, 912.
Ragland, page 52.
Conclusion.
The writer has taken depositions in a large variety of actions, and has found them to be one of the most valuable
weapons of the lawyer. In cases which savor of blackmail a
prompt demand for the deposition of the plaintiff usually
stops the case at the threshold. In malpractice cases the plaintiff is advised of the technical defense of the physician and
learns how to meet it, while the defendant doctor can turn
the tables and commit the plaintiff at the inception of the
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case to what his facts really are. And the same is true in all
personal injury cases, because when the actual injuries of
plaintiff are ascertained, settlements are greatly simplified. In
cases against fraudulent stock salesmen an immediate application for deposition, plus a subpoena duces tecum for their
books, is conducive to rapid settlement.
As lawyers we seek the truth. Oftimes we find,
to our
sorrow, that our own client has withheld vital facts. If so,
we prefer to have those facts produced at the deposition rather
than to meet a non-suit after a battle in court. And if the
other party has a questionable case, the sooner we drag it out
into the light of day, so that we can reduce it to writing and
then check it with the facts, the better for litigants and the
Bar.
England and several of our states provide special procedure by which either party may call upon the adversary to
admit, for the purposes of the trial, the existence of facts. Our
deposition statutes give us that, and more. And with the right
of cross-examination, now fully conferred, we look for a
widespread adoption of depositions as fact finders, time
savers and docket reducers.
Recently graduated law students may in this depression
era be forced to the status pictured in the following advertisement copied from the Prescott Miner (Arizona) of August, 1879:
STEPHEN G. MORAN
(Jack of All Trades)
Attorney at Law, will practice in all courts, draws deeds
and all papers; veterinary surgeon and General contractor.
Cleans vaults, whitewashes fences, digs wells, saws and chops
wood. Translates French, German and Spanish papers.
Works by the day, hour or job. Office at residence on Goose
Flat. Give me a call.
Simon Quiat, Samuel S. Ginsberg and Nathan H. Creamer have
associated themselves as co-partners under the firm name of Quiat, Ginsberg 4 Creamer, 850 Equitable Building, Tabor 1366.
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THE NEW DEAL REACHES MUDDY CREEK
The Bank of Muddy Creek, Tennessee, Established 1792, Capital
$15,000 and Surplus $13,000, seizes pen in hand, per its cashier, and
under date of March 23 writes to the vice-president of the Citizens
Union National Bank of Louisville.
We have been trying (says the cashier) to get a loan from the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation for about a month but don't seem
to be able to get our papers in shape to suit them. We need a loan bad
right now and our bank examiner said that you were a sensible banker
and could advise us how to get the money quick * * *. Our bank
has lost some deposits in the last year, some for government bonds
and some for postal savings, but most for ordinary living expenses.
Our farmers have not done very well for the last three years and are
in a bad fix * * * but prospects are mightly good * * *. Our
county agricultural agent has worked out a plan which he has been
experimenting with for several years and which sure looks good to us
bankers here. His plan is for the cotton growers to stock their farms
with fetid goats, a new kind of breed of goats which have been developed by the Australians. These goats will eat most anything except
the cotton pod * * *. Another thing is that these goats give off a
very offensive smell and it has been proved that it really lessens the
danger of boll weevil, as this insect is a Anthonomus Grandis and is of
the species that breathe air, at least in the adult stage, for which purpose there is usually an internal system of trachac opening by spiracles
along the sides of its body. I don't know much about the anatomy of
a weevil only what Prof. Abernathy * * * has stated. And another
thing the goats are supposed to enrich the soil considerably. It has been
found by our Experimental Station that goat manure is extremely rich
in nitrogen, phosphorus, calcium and a scad of other elements, according to * * * tests made * * * by our Commissioner of Agriculture,
a copy of which I will be glad to send you on request. These goats
also produce a fine quality of wool.
Mr. Davis, we are all hard working farmers in this section, churchgoing and God-fearing religious citizens, mostly Baptists and we need
help right now. We are coming to Louisville next Sunday to see you
about a loan and about fixing up our papers. We planned to be at
the Capitol Hotel and will be there Sunday morning. We won't have
much time but would like for you to meet us when our bus gets there
at 10 o'clock. * * * We have heard a lot about you from bankers
who have attended your baseball parties and they all tell us that you
are a very sound banker and can give us the right kind of advice. We
have also heard you are experienced in filling out all of those loan papers
267
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and goodness knows we need some help on them. * * * Can't you
get us a good man to do this work as we don't have any real estate
agents or lawyers (!) in our town. These appraisement forms which
they sent us to be filled in is simple enough but good lord it would
take us another month to fill in a couple of these. We enclose one
herein and you can see for yourself the things that they want to know
about a mortgage. Can you bring a typewriter to the hotel with you?
We are bringing our bookkeeper with us who can write on a machine
but can't take any shorthand. She can do all the writing and will
save some expense. Mr. Davis, you have just got to help us out as we
can't keep open much longer if we don't get some money soon. Our
reserves are down to several hundred dollars now and the bank examiners are likely to come in most any time.
You had better bring a full set of all papers which we will need
as the blanks which we got in Nashville may be different and we don't
want any delay in getting this loan through on time.
Editor's Note.-There will be a lawyer in Muddy Creek just as
soon as we can borrow the price of a ticket on that 10 o'clock bus.

THIS FELLOW'S ALREADY ADMITTED HERE.
READ SOME OF HIS PLEADINGS

WE'VE

"Police Department,
"Secretary State Bar.
"Blank, Oklahoma, Jan. 18, 1933.
"Dear Sirs:
"I want tow Get some infermashion reards License to Practice
Law I red Law years a go in mo and have had Lots of Experience with
law. I have Just Served 2 years as Justice of Peace and Poliece Judg of
Blank I have red Black Stone and other atharity on Law and Holey
and mcgragor on Criminal Law and helped to try a number of cases
and have wone them before a Justice court. Lots of my Friends want
me to handle their Suits for them if just had license is it Posable For
you to fernish Licence for me Please write me and tell what I must
do hoping to hear from you soon I remain
"Local Jim Sabin" (that's not really his name).
"P.S. Some of these young attorney dont want me to get in the
Law Bisness. I spoke to one of them and Said what about me Practicing Law Befor the Justice Court and he dident want me to they
have a late Law against it. It usto be you could Practice Law exsept
before a Court of Record I havent any Thing to do now and if I
had licence I could make a living out of it. They wont have me on
Public work on account of my age I dont Drink or have any Imorel
habits.
"Some and most people think I am a Grate orter."-The Bar Examiner via The Brief of Phi Delta Phi.

DICTA

269

BAR PICNIC
By CHARLES J. KELLY

The Sixth Annual Outing of the Denver Bar Association was held at Mount Vernon Country Club on Thursday,
June 15th, and was well attended, about one hundred and
eighty members being present. An afternoon of golf, tennis,
baseball, horseshoe pitching and bridge ended without any
casualties. At six o'clock the annual horseshoe pitching contest between the Bench and the Bar was staged, accompanied
by a real old-fashioned German band playing "Happy Days
Are Here Again." The Bar was victorious, the band being
too great a handicap for the Bench. During dinner the band
played many request numbers, accompanied by the many who
by that time had been moved to song.
A short program followed the dinner, the Spanish
dancer leading off. She will be asked again next year. George
Crowder in "King Lear" pleased and surprised us. It is now
no secret that George has another profession.
The time honored custom of passing over the gavel by
the outgoing President, Albert Gould, to the new President,
Frazer Arnold, was the feature of the day. Space does not
permit printing the speeches, but for those who missed
Frazer's speech we add that this was the "something new and
novel" event on the program.
All in all it was a most successful affair, and the Committee is sorry if you missed it.
The prize winners in the various events were as follows:
Tennis-Harold B. Wagner and Carl Whitehead.
Golf-George Winters, Judge Luxford and Floyd Walpole.
Bridge-Dudley Strickland and Irving Linder.
Horseshoe Pitching-Edward V. Dunklee.
CORRECT YOUR DICTA!
The same erudite department, viz., Dicta Observes, op. cit., says
(their capitals): "CORRECT YOUR COLORADO REPORTS. In
55 Colo., at page 41, the following quotation is found from Denver
Tramway Co. vs. Cowan, 51 Colo. 64 * * *." And adds an injunction to attorneys to report errors in Colorado reports to the Editors.
Which leads us to remark: Let the courts take care of their own
errors. They make them.

PARTIES-PROPER PARTY PLAINTIFF IN SUIT TO RECOVER AGAINST
SURETY-COUNTY TREASURER-Bell vs. The People of the

State of Colorado-No. 13306-Decided May 22, 1933--Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
Suit was brought in the court below in the name of The People
of the State of Colorado against Bell, who was surety on a County
Treasurer's bond, the suit being based on alleged failure of the County
Treasurer to account for and turn over moneys in his hands as such
Treasurer. It was contended below that the plaintiff was improperly
named in that the suit should have been brought in the name of the
People of the State of Colorado for the use of the Board of County
Commissioners of Garfield County.
1. Held: The plaintiff had capacity to sue and suit was brought
in the proper name.-Judgment affirmed.
PRACTICE -INSTRUCTIONS
-SOLE
PROXIMATE CAUSE-Zang vs.
Wright-No. 12819-Decided May 22, 1933--Opinion by Mr.
Justice Campbell.
This was an automobile accident case for damages for personal injuries. Among the instructions given by the Court below was one to
the effect that in order for the plaintiff to recover that the alleged
negligent acts of the defendant must be a proximate cause of the in-

juries sustained.
I.
Held that such instruction was erroneous in not advising the
jury that the alleged negligent acts of the defendant must be the sole
proximate cause and not a proximate cause. -Judgment reversed.

LANDLORD AND TENANT-LEASE-PURPOSE OF-CONSTRUCTION
OF-Vick Roy vs. General Outdoor Advertising Co., Inc.-No.
13106-Decided May 22, 1933--Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
1. A suit was instituted by the plaintiff for the recovery of rent.
From a judgment for the plaintiff in the Justice Court, the defendant
appealed to the County Court where judgment was entered for the defendant. Plaintiff was the lessor and the defendant the lessee of the roof
of a building to be used for display advertising. The lease provided
"The tenant reserves the right to cancel this lease by giving 60 days'
written notice to the landlord, in case the view of the advertising displays becomes obstructed." Pursuant to this provision of the lease,
defendant served notice on the plaintiff that the view to the leased prop-
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erty had become obstructed and that it, therefore, desired to terminate
the lease. The obstruction complained of was the growth of nearby
trees. On the trial in the County Court, the jury inspected the premises
and, pursuant to their inspection, found for the defendant.
2. "Any act of the lessor by which his tenant is deprived of the
enjoyment of the whole or a material or substantial part of the demised
premises, * * * amounts in law to an eviction." If the trees which
caused the obstruction belonged to the plaintiff and he had permitted
them to grow so as to interfere with the view, there is no doubt but
that the judgment should be affirmed inasmuch as defendant provided
that if the view "becomes obstructed" the same conclusion must be
reached.--Judgment of the County Court affirmed.

RECEIVERS -

FOREIGN

CORPORATIONS -

ASSESSMENT -

AGAINST

STOCKHOLDERS-PROCEDURE-PUBLIC POLICY---Chandler vs.
Manifold-No. 13301-Decided May 22, 1933--Opinion by
Mr. Justice Bouck.
1. Action by the United States court in Minnesota of levying an
assessment against stockholders of a Minnesota corporation, at a hearing
which was not held within the required length of time after the date of
the order fixing the hearing, was a violation of the contract between
the stockholder and the corporation, and was invalid except as to those
stockholders actually appearing at the hearing or those duly served in
Minnesota. Therefore, the assessment cannot be enforced in Colorado
against a Colorado stockholder to whom notice of the hearing had been
mailed.
2. The procedure, concerning the levying of such an assessment,
to which the stockholder must have assented by becoming a stockholder,
must contemplate a specific period during which the assessment might
be paid. An order requiring payment forthwith, and permitting the
receiver forthwith to recover the assessment by suit, is contrary to the
public policy of the. Colorado practice.-Judgment affirmed.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-FINDINGS-SUFFICIENCY - REOPENING CASE-Winteroth vs. IndustrialCommission--No. 13304Decided May 29, 1933--Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
Winteroth sustained accidental injury arising out of and in the
course of his employment consisting of a sprain or torn ligament in the
left knee. The Industrial Commission found that the injury accrued
July 17, 1931, and that temporary total disability terminated December 1, 1931, and that claimant had sustained a 25% loss of the use of
the left leg measured at the knee and awarded compensation therefor

under section 73 of Workmen's Compensaton Act.

272

DICTA

1. The findings were sufficiently detailed so as not to require a
remanding.
2. The award was properly made under section 73 of the act
and does not come under section 78 of the said act. An award under
section 78 could be supported only by a finding of the extent in percentage of general permanent disability and there was no such finding nor
any evidence upon which such finding could be based.
3. The trial court did not err in refusing to enter an order requiring the commission to reopen the case so as to permit Winteroth to
show that since the award his condition has grown worse. The commission has discretion to reopen the case on its own motion.--Judgmert
affirmed.
TAX DEED--REGULARITY-SALE LATER THAN SECOND MONDAY OF

NOVEMBER-City and County of Denver vs. Bach-No. 12744
-Decided May 29, 1933-Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
Bach brought suit to quiet title to certain lots in Denver, claiming under a tax deed executed subsequent to the second Monday in
November but containing a recital that sale was'held on such later date
due to inability of treasurer to compile the advertised lists within the
time prescribed by statute. Judgment below for plaintiff.
1. A tax deed reciting a sale commencing later than the second
Monday in November and also reciting good cause for the delay, shows
a sale authorized by statute and is not void on its face but is prima
facie valid; and it is sufficient to cast upon the one attacking it the
burden of showing its invalidity.--Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Justice Burke dissents.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-LIABILITY FOR TORTS IN GOVERNMENTAL CAPACITY-COLLISIONS--RIGHT OF WAY-Johnson
vs. Baugher et al.-Nos. 12738, 12739, 12752, 12753-Decided
May 29, 1933--Opinion by Mr. Justice Campbell.
Four suits were consolidated for trial below growing out of personal injuries sustained in collision of two automobiles, one of which
was driven by a police officer in the line of duty. The Court below
refused to permit plaintiff to introduce certain ordinances of the City
of Denver governing right of way at intersections of police cars and
instructed the jury that the car in which the injured plaintiff was riding
had the right of way and the court directed verdict for the City of

Denver.
1. The court erred in not admitting said ordinances. The evidence showed that one of the cars was being driven by a police officer
in line of duty. The question of who had the right of way was a
question for the jury and the ordinances were proper for the jury to

consider in this connection.

DICTA

273

2. The city was at the time acting in its public or governmental
capacity and is not liable for damages for the alleged injury to any of
the plaintiffs. -Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
PLEADING-RIGHT TO INTERVENE-CAUSE OF ACTION ACQUIRED
PENDENTE LITE-Hollingsworth vs. Hunn-No. 12787-Decided May 29, 1933-Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Adams.
Hunn and others sued as stockholders to wind up defunct Multa
Trina Ditch Company. While this suit was pending, Hollingsworth
levied upon shares of stock held by defendants in this suit and 5 days
before the day set for trial in this action, filed petition in intervention
and sought to file an answer which the court below denied.
1. At the time this suit was brought Hollingsworth had no
claim of any kind and would not even have been a proper party. The
parties to this suit, through whom Hollingsworth claims to have acquired the stock through a levy, continued as the representatives of such
interests.
2. The request to intervene came too late.
3. The defendants whose interest were acquired had put in issue
all defenses available to any stockholder.
4. Hollingsworth was a purchaser pendente lite and bought at
her peril.-Judgment affirmed.

ASSIGNMENTS FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS-COMMON LAW ASSIGNMENT-RIGHTS OF UNACKNOWLEDGED CHATTEL MORTGAGEE

-McMinn vs. Harrison-No. 12805-Decided May 29, 1933Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
A common law assignment was made to Harrison for benefit of
creditors of a drug store stock and fixtures. After he took possession
under the assignment, McMinn set up claim for a lien by virtue of a
written instrument, denominated a lease, not acknowledged but recorded, but which had the effect of a chattel mortgage as security for
the purchase price. The lower court denied the claim of McMinn.
1. When the assignee, with assent of any of the creditors, took
possession of the drug stock and store under the assignment, his claim
became superior to that of an unacknowledged chattel mortgage.
2. A common law assignment is valid in Colorado .notwithstanding the special statute in regard to assignments for the benefit of
creditors.
3. Where a mortgagor in possession is- permitted to sell the
mortgaged property such as a stock of merchandise in the usual course
of trade, it is void as against creditors and third persons.
4. Such a mortgage upon a merchandise stock could at most
only apply to the stock on hand at the time of the mortgage and the
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burden is on mortgagee to identify same.--Judgment affirmed in part
and reversed in part.
Mr. Justice Butler, Mr. Justice Moore and Mr. Justice Hilliard
dissent.

GUARANTY-DRAFTS-FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION-The Raceland
Bank & Trust Co. vs. The Pueblo Savings & Trust Co.-No.
12928-Decided May 29, 1933--Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
The Raceland Bank & Trust Company sued the Pueblo Savings
Trust Company for $1,147.50 on telegraphic guaranty. The King
Fruit Company sought to purchase carload of Triumph potatoes by
telegram and offered to buy minimum car. The Pueblo Bank wired
the Raceland Bank: "We guarantee payment draft car Triumphs Pacific
number 6449 La Fourche Produce Company King Fruit Company."
Pursuant to this, instead of minimum car of 24,000 pound, a car of
42,500 pounds was shipped, which upon arrival at Pueblo were decomposed and destroyed by the City Health Department. The Pueblo
Bank refused to pay the draft. The court below directed verdict for
Pueblo Bank.
1. A fair construction of the guaranty is that the Pueblo Bank
guaranteed the payment of the draft drawn for the purchase price of
potatoes fit for human consumption.
2.
Such guaranty does not require the Pueblo Bank to pay a
draft drawn for the purchase price of something that, for all practical
purposes, was non-existent. The transaction does not come within the
terms of the guaranty.-Judgment affirmed.

MORTGAGES-RIGHT OF HOLDERS OF UNCERTIFIED BONDS-Thede
vs. The Colorado National Bank of Denver-No. 13210-Decided May 29, 1933-Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
The Equitable Bond and Mortgage Company entered into a trust
agreement with The Colorado National Bank, as trustee, whereby it
was to issue certain savings bonds and deposit with the trustee securities therefor of not less than 110% of the face value of such bonds,
which bonds were to be certified by the bank, such securities to be held
for the pro rata benefit of such certified bonds. Without the knowledge
of the bank, the company issued bonds to plaintiff below and others
which were not certified. The company went into receivership and
this action was brought by the holders of uncertified bonds to share
in the above trust funds. The court below denied this relief.
1. The holders of uncertified bonds have no right to participate
in a distribution of the trust fund to the prejudice of the rights of
the holders of certified bonds.--Judgment affirmed.
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ATTORNEYS AT LAW-REINSTATEMENT AFTER DISBARMENT-The

People vs. Lindsey-No. 12130-Decided June 5, 1933-Opir,ion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
The petitioner, Ben B. Lindsey, a former Judge of the Juvenile
Court of the City and County of Denver, asks to be reinstated as a
member of the Colorado bar.
1. Where, after an attorney has been disbarred, he publishes a
book containing unbridled and venomous language denouncing those
members of this court who took part in the disbarment proceedings,
and files thereafter a petition to be reinstated as an attorney at law
but offers no evidence of regret or expression of sorrow in extenuation
of such unseemly tirade, he is not entitled to be reinstated.
2. Such petition will be denied so long as those charges stand
without a manly apology such as one worthy of readmission to active
membership in Xhe legal profession would be willing and anxious to
make.-Petition for reinstatement denied.
Mr. Justice Butler and Mr. Justice Hilliard dissent.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-GAME REFUGE-Maitlandvs. The People-

No. 13266-Decided June 5, 1933--Opinion by Mr. Justice
Butler.
Maitland was convicted of killing a buck deer within the limits
of the Colorado State Game Refuge and was fined $25. He challenges
the constitutionality of the act creating the game refuge.
1. The game refuge act does not contravene that part of our constitution forbidding the General Assembly to pass local or special laws.
The fact that Maitland owned a ranch within such game refuge and that
the act makes it a crime for him to kill a deer on his own land, whereas
his neighbors just outside the refuge can kill a deer in open season without being guilty of an offense does not make the act a local or special
law. The act applies to all persons alike. It is not special legislation.
2. The act does not offend against that article in our constitution providing that private property shall not be taken or damaged
for public or private use without compensation. Whenever legislative
protection is accorded game, some harm usually is done to some person
as an incident to such protection but incidental injuries are not sufficient
to render the protecting statute unconstitutional.-Judgment affirmed.

LIFE INSURANCE -

PLEADING-

PAYMENT -BURDEN

OF PROOF-

The Sethman Electric & Manufacturing Co. vs. Mountain States
Life InsuranceCo.-No. 12816-Decided June 12, 1933--Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
Suit below was on a life insurance policy issued by defendant
upon the life of George Henry Sethman which policy was assigned to
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the plaintiff. Defendant below, as affirmative defense, alleged that failure to pay any premium when due worked a forfeiture and alleged
that neither the insured nor the assignee paid the premium due December 22, 1926. Plaintiff in replication generally denied the allegations
of non-payment and plead extended insurance. Court below refused
to permit evidence of payment of premium on part of plaintiff because
payment was not plead.
1. Payment is an affirmative defense and must be so pleaded;
but, where an answer alleges non-payment and a reply in the nature
of a general denial is filed, the issue then is not payment but non-payment. The burden was on the defendant to prove non-payment and a
general denial of non-payment in replication is sufficient for the admission of evidence on the part of plaintiff tending to prove payment.
2. A contract entered into between an insurance company and
the assured subsequent to the issuance of the policy, changing the time
and method of payment of premium, is admissible, notwithstanding C.
L. 1921, Sec. 2516, which provides that the policy shall constitute
the entire contract. Such statute does not mean that the policy shall
continue to be the sole contract between the parties. It only refers to
the policy as originally issued, and should not be construed to abrogate
the rule that competent parties shall enjoy freedom of contract.--Judgment reversed.
WATERS-ADVERSE POSSESSION-PAYMENT OF TAXES FOR SEVEN

YEARS-The Pleasant Valley & Lake Canal Co. vs. MaxwellNo. 12842-Decided June 12, 1933--Opinion by Mr. Justice
Campbell.
Maxwell and wife, plaintiffs below, brought this action against
The Pleasant Valley and Lake Canal Company for a decree quieting
their title to certain water right. The defendant denied any title in
plaintiffs. Court below entered decree for plaintiffs.
1. Where plaintiffs and their predecessors in title have, for a
period of more than thirty years, been in the actual, open, notorious,
continuous, adverse and exclusive possession of sufficient water for the
irrigation of 50 acres, the same being 50 inches of the waters at any
time in The Pleasant Valley and Lake Canal Company hostile to
defendant and under claim of right, the plaintiffs have good title to
the 50 inches of water.
2. Where the plaintiffs and predecessors in title and interest have,
for a period of more than seven years been in actual, open, notorious,
continuous, adverse and exclusive possession of sufficient water at any
time in Pleasant Valley and Lake Canal to fully irrigate 50 acres of
land, the same being 50 inches of water, hostile to defendant and under
claim and color of title made in good faith and have, during said time,
paid all taxes legally assessed thereon, the plaintiffs have good title to
said 50 inches of water.
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3. The title to the plaintiffs in and to said water shall not be
deemed in any way to determine or affect the rights of grantees and
their successors in interest under deeds for water for neighboring lands
theretofore executed by the defendant company, and the same shall be
subject to all prior rights thus acquired.--Judgment affirmed.

BILL AND

NOTES-ALTERATION-POSSESSION

AS

CONSTRUCTIVE

NOTICE-HOMESTEAD CLAIM-Farley et al. vs. Harvey-No.
13324-Decided June 19, 1933--Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
Mrs. Farley was record owner of residence on which she and her
husband resided. To pay off a mortgage, two new loans were negotiated, the first for $4,500 to Parker Realty Company of which Harvey
became owner. It contained express waiver of homestead right. Mrs.
Harvey later made marginal homestead reservation. Upon non-payment foreclosure was had and Harvey secured trustee's deed. Action below by Mrs. Farley and husband to quiet title against Harvey. Judgment below, for Harvey.
1. Where alteration of note is claimed on ground that description of property securing it was endorsed on note but evidence is conflicting as to when it was so endorsed, finding of court below in general
findings for defendant disposes of question.
2. There is no variance between note and deed of trust where
both husband and wife sign note but wife only signs deed of trust and
deed of trust recites that only wife executed the note.
3.
Where title is in wife's name, fact that husband resides on
the property is no notice of joint ownership claim of husband.
4. Mrs. Farley's homestead claim is impotent as against the
foreclosure of her deed of trust.--Judgment affirmed.

EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS-PROOF OF CLAIM-EXHIBITING
ORIGNAL NOTE-STATUTE OF NON-CLAIM-Bender vs. Ander-

son, Executrix-No. 13277-Decided June 19, 1933--Opinion
by Mr. Justice Bouch.
Bender filed in County Court affidavit of a proposed claim for
balance due on promissory note, as per copy attached. The attached
copy does not mention her as a party to the note nor is an endorsement
by payee shown. After expiration of year, Bender moved, without
notice, to amend claim which was denied and claim dismissed. Bender
appealed to District Court and there no attempt was made to amend
the claim nor was there any offer made of the original note and claim
was dismissed.
1. There could be no valid claim until and unless the original
note should be exhibited or filed. This never happened, The District
Court which tried the case de novo could only act on what came before
it. Its ruling on the motion to dismiss was right.--Judgment affirmed.
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PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-COMPLETION BOND--CONFLICTING INTERESTS OF AGENT-KNOWLEDGE OF INTERESTS-Independence

Indemnity Co. vs. The Silver State Building and Loan Association
-No. 1285 1-Decided June 19, 1933--Opinion by Mr. Justice
Butler.
The Silver State Building and Loan Association recovered judgment below upon a completion bond. In June, 1928, The Dencol Investment Co. and the building association made an agreement for exchange of properties. The Dencol Investment Co. was to and did exchange an apartment building which was under construction for properties of the building and loan association and the Dencol Co. gave
a completion bond that it would complete the apartment building free
and clear of all liens. Randolph Crews was the sole agent for the bonding company and also owned practically all the stock in the Dencol Investment Co. He never reported issuing the bond to his company and
the company never received any premium and it had no knowledge of
the transaction until the loan association made claim against it on the
bond, after Crews had disappeared and the apartment building left uncompleted.
1. Where the statutory agent of a bonding company also had
power of attorney generally authorizing him to write bonds with the
same effect as though executed by the president and secretary, such
broad powers are not sufficient to authorize the execution of a bond in
a transaction in which the agent has a personal interest adverse to that
of his principal or represents another who has an interest adverse
thereto.
2. If the obligee accepts the bond knowing that the agent has or
represents such adverse interest, he cannot recover on the bond, unless
he proves that the principal with full knowledge of the facts, assented
to, or ratified the act of the agent.
3. The rule that where an agent is the sole representative of the
corporation, the corporation cannot claim anything except through him
and if it claims through him, after notice of the facts, it must accept his
agency 'with its attendant notice, does not apply in this case because the
bonding company is not seeking to enforce any contract made by its
agent or claiming any right under the contract.--Judgment reversed.

TAXATION-AUTHORITY OF DISTRICT COURT TO REDUCE TAX ASSESSMENT FIXED BY THE COLORADO TAx COMMISSION-Colo-

rado Tax Commission vs. Midland Terminal Railway Co.-No.
12963-DecidedJune 26, 1933-Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
This case having been consolidated for trial with Colorado Tax
Commission vs. Midland Terminal Railway Company, No. 12962, is
governed by the decision of this Court in the last mentioned case. The
only real difference is that while the latter case involves the District
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Court's reduction in the El Paso County portion of a tax assessment,
this case involves a judgment purporting to reduce the Teller County
portion of the same tax assessment, from $654,330, fixed by the commission, to $345,138, fixed by the District Court.--Judgment reversed
and case remanded with directions to enter a judgment affirming the
Commission's assessment.
APPEAL AND ERROR-EQUALLY DIVIDED COURT-The Midland Oil

Refining Co. vs. Allen-No. 13331-Decided June 26, 1933Opinion per curiam.
Mr. Justice Moore did not participate. Three of the justices are in
favor of affirmance and three in favor of reversal. The case, therefore,
stands affirmed by operation of law because of an equally divided court.
No good purpose would be served by a statement of the issues or reasons of the conclusions of the several members of the Court.-Judgment affirmed.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS-DECEIT-FOREIGN JUDGMENT-Zahn us. Enyart et al.-No. 13274
-Decided June 26, 1933-Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Adams.
Plaintiffs Zahn originally brought suit in Kansas against Frank
Enyart, a resident of Colorado. Enyart's mother, without authority,
employed Kansas attorney to defend the action. He entered personal
appearance and judgment was later entered against Frank Enyart. Frank
Enyart sought to set aside judgment in Kansas, but was unsuccessful.
Plaintiffs then brought suit in Colorado on the foreign judgment and
same defense was interposed and defense was successful.
Later the
mother of Frank Enyart died and plaintiffs filed claim against her estate
for damages in the sum of $18,783.85, on the theory that the deceased
had wrongfully employed the Kansas attorney and thereby plaintiffs
had been prevented from obtaining a personal judgment against her
son in Colorado. County Court dismissed the claim, and on appeal
to the District Court, the claim was dismissed.
1. One who falsely represents himself to be the agent of another is liable in an action on the, case to those who are injured by his
misrepresentations.
2.
However, if there be any liability, it should not go beyond
that which plaintiffs actually lost by the deceased's unauthorized employment of Kansas attorney on behalf of her son.
3.
But there is a total failure to show that plaintiffs suffered any
injury by reason of the conduct of the deceased in employing such attorney.
4.
In Kansas plaintiffs lost nothing because the court there declined to interfere with the judgment in personam against Frank Enyart. Likewise, in Colorado, the conduct of the deceased failed to alter
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or impair plaintiff's original status, for if the deceased had kept wholly
out of the transaction, plaintiffs would have had nothing more than
a judgment in rem to carry to this state, and they still have it.
5.
For the reasons stated, the claim was properly disallowed.-

Judgment affirmed.
PRACTICE-CHANGE OF VENUE-PROPER PLACE FOR TRIAL-Kim-

berlin vs. Rutliff-No. 13323-Decided June 26, 1933--Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
Error is assigned by the denial of application for change of place
of trial. Suit was brought in Pueblo County for failure to perform the
terms of a written contract by which the parties were to exchange real
properties, that of the plaintiff's situate in Pueblo and that of the defendant in Canon City. Defendant applied for change of venue to
Fremont County and showed by affidavit that service of process was
in Fremont County and that the defendant was a resident of Fremont
County. These statements were not controverted. In the complaint.
however, it was alleged that the contract was to have been performed
in Pueblo .County, and this was not negatived in the showing made
for change of venue. The court denied the application and defendant
declining to plead further, judgment was entered against defendant for
damages prayed for.
1. The court erred in denying the motion for change of venue.
The contract is silent as to place of performance. In that situation the
Code provision relative to the right of trial in the county where the
contract is to be performed is not applicable. Such provision has reference to contracts, which, by their terms, are to be performed at a particular place.
2. In determining the question of place of trial, the court was
not at liberty to give consideration to the allegation of the complaint
that the contract was to be performed in Pueblo County where the contract itself was set out and is silent as to place of performance.
3. The record considered, the action must be regarded as personal and held to be triable in the county of the defendant's residence.-

Judgment reversed and ordered that application for change of venue to
Fremont County be granted.

vs.
Moore-No. 13335-Decided June 26, 1933---Opinion by Mr.
Justice Bouck.
This is an application under rule 18 of the Supreme Court for
a review of an order appointing a receiver. Plaintiff and defendant were
partners in a mining property and had been for several years. Plaintiff
brought suit for dissolution, accounting and receivership. At the time
RECEIVERSHIP-APPOINTMENT OF-Ex PARTE WHEN-Oberto
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of serving the summons and the complaint, defendant was served with
notice that the plaintiff would call for hearing the application for appointment of a receiver two days later. The motion requested that the
plaintiff be appointed receiver. The morning after having been served,
defendant phoned his attorneys and he promptly mailed to them the
papers he had received. The attorneys were quite a distance from the
Court and immediately advised the Court that they could not be present.
Defendant and his attorneys were not present at the hearing for the
receivership and pursuant to that hearing a "Temporary Receiver" was
appointed and the defendant was ordered to show cause why the appointment of said temporary receiver should not be made permanent.
On the return day of the citation to show cause, defendant's attorney
filed a demurrer to the complaint. Arguments were had on the demurrer, which was overruled, but no evidence was taken.
1. If there are special cases that require ex parte action in the
appointment of a receiver, they are limited to "Momentous emergencies,
which manifestly threaten dire destruction of health, safety or irretrievable estate." No such emergency existed here. There was no contention that the defendant was insolvent.
2. The issuance of a citation requiring the defendant to show
cause why the ex parte appointment should not be made permanent did
not cure the vital defect in that appointment.
3. The partnership contract provided that in the event of differences between them, the controversy should be referred to arbitration.
The court refused to pass upon the failure of the plaintiff to so do, for
this issue may be litigated in the main case.-Judgment reversed with

the directions.
TAXATION -

ASSESSMENT -

SCOPE OF

REVIEW BY COURT

-

REVIEW-PRESUMPTIONS-BURDEN

PURPOSE

AND

OF PROOF-

Colorado Tax Commission vs. The Midland Terminal Railway
Company-No. 12962-Decided June 26, 1933-Opinion by
Mr. Justice Bouck.
1. On appeal to the District Court to review an assessment made
by the Colorado Tax Commission, the court may not try the matter
de novo, nor substitute its own opinion as to value in place of the judgment and discretion of the Tax Commission as an administrative agency
of the executive branch of government. Nor may the court correct mere
errors in the exercise of such discretion by the commission. The sole
power of the court, on such review, is to determine whether or not an
assessment is manifestly excessive, and, if not, whether it is also manifestly fraudulent, erroneous or oppressive.
2.
There is a definite and well settled presumption that an assessment made by the regular assessing officers is correct. Such an assess-

ment'cannot be overthrown except by clear and convincing evidence ad-
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duced by him who assails it.--Judgment reversed and case remanded
with directions.
Mr. Chief Justice Adams and Mr. Justice Campbell dissent.
DRAINAGE DISTRICTS -

ASSESSMENTS -

PROCEEDS -

ADDITIONAL

LEVY-Henry Wilcox & Son vs. Riverview Drainage DistrictNo. 12975-Decided June 26, 1933-Opinion by Mr. Justice
Burke.
I. Sec. 2169 C. L. 1921, concerns drainage districts, and provides that the tax levied by the district shall be such "as will meet the
requirements of and will provide for the punctual payment of the interest upon and the principal of the bonds as the same accrue," and
requires the district to make an additional levy if the "proceeds" of
the original levy are not sufficient to pay the principal of and interest
on "all of the bonds which may at any time be issued." Under this
section, the word "proceeds" means whatever the levy produces, which
may be cash or tax sale certificates or both. The original levy having
produced sufficient of such "proceeds" to meet its demands, the district
could not be compelled by mandamus to levy an additional assessment to
raise sufficient cash to pay the principal of matured bonds.
2.
Irrespective of said section, however, those who, in a drainage district, pay their taxes, are not also subject to the taxes of those
who do not pay. In the absence of sufficient cash proceeds from the
levy, the bondholders must look to each tract of land as security for the
taxes levied thereon.-Judgment affirmed.
IT

TAKES TIME, ROBERT, IT

TAKES TIME

In the sprightly monthly column entitled Dicta Observes (10
DICTA 223) it is announced that the quondam dean of the law school
of the University of Colorado has gone back to work for a living.
Recounting the Dean's adventures on the campus our learned contemporary remarks: "Mr. Stearns, very shortly after taking charge at Boulder,
won the respect and honor of the faculty and the students."

OBITUARIES
James P. Veerkamp, Monte Vista, Colorado.
Isaac Dunn, Denver, Colorado.
Judge Julian H. Moore, Denver, Colorado.

